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REMCO, INC., et al.,
Third Party Defendants
and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case actually involves the rights of the parties on
a lien foreclosure, based upon a labor and material mans
lien on a sub-contract agreement for the dry-wall work on
an apartment house in Cedar City, Utah. At an earlier hearing, the court had ordered the lien discharged upon the payment into court of a specific sum determined by the court.
While the lien had actually been released by court order,
the matter still arises under Title 38, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Honorable J. Harlan Burns, District Judge, awarded judgement against the defendant Remco, Incorporated,
only, for the sum of $5,990.14, being $4,064.94, on the contract, interest in the amount of $325.20, together with
$1,600.00 attorney fees, and ordered a satisfaction of judgment, when said sums were paid out of the sums posted with
1
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the clerk, and in addition awarded judgment of no cause of
action, on the cross-claim and counter-claim of Remco, Incorporated.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent seeks to have the judgment affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties entered into a sub-contract agreement
which is Plaintiff's exhibit 2, entered in evidence, as is often
the case, each party blames the other for the matter not
working, however it is undenied that paragraph 5 of the
contract, required almost immediate payment of the materials, and about the only basis Wagstaff could enter into the
contract was, being able to buy his materials in bulk. Doing
this should have been advantageous for both parties. It was
admitted that when Mr. Wagstaff moved off the job, these
materials Wiere not paid for and that the contract was never
current at any time thereafter. The appellant failed to provide the Supreme Court with a complete transcript and the
Respondent has provided the Supreme Court with a reporters transcript of the opening statements of counsel and
items of this nature. In this short transcript this may be
found beginning at page 12, line 14, and continuing to page
12, line 23. The only point that should have been tried after
these admissions, was the amount of damages of Wagstaff.
Wagstaff did not at any time refuse to go back onto the
job, he took the position at all times that he was obligated
to complete the job, that he was ready and willing to do
same as soon as the payments were available so that he
could pay the people that he was obligated to. There is no
question that at all times, from the time Wagstaff put materials on the job, and Remco failed to pay for same in accordance with the contract, up to the time of the trial, there
was money due and owing to Wagstaff, and that at any and
all times during that period, he was entitled to a lien under
the provisions of Title 38, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended, and t h a t he did file such a lien. There is some argument over the amount of the lien, however, at the time of
the lien, said lien was not filed in sufficient size, and the
payments made thereafter, more than totaled the lien.

2
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THE DEPENDANT HAD BREACHED THE CONTRACT.
In the first place Wagstaff is entitled to have the trial
court action viewed in the light most favorable to him in
view of the decision that has been rendered and this has
been upheld by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, in
the case of Buehner Block Co. vs. Glezo's, 6 Utah 2nd, 226,
310 Pacific 2nd, 517, also the case of Beck vs. Jeppsson, 1
Utah 2nd, 127, 262 Pacific 2nd, 760.
There is no argument that Remco failed to pay in accordance with the terms of the contract, in paragraph 5
thereof, also from the nature of the case, it was quite apparent that Remco was in trouble financially in as much as
the plaintiff John P. Jordon filed a lien and started a foreclosure on same, and his ammended complaint included besides Remco, Incorporated, and Robert Richins, eighteen
other defendants, seventeen of which had filed liens. The
big end of these liens were actually discharged by agreement, by the payment of the lien costs plus twenty five percent, (25%). At anytime there is money due and owing on a
sub-contract for the construction of a building, under the
terms of the contract, there is a breach of contract.
While Remco took the attitude that they had reservations about paying, there was actually only one item that
came up that in anyway was proper to pay, and that would
not have come up had Remco complied with the contract and
made the payments. The liens complained of pertaining to
Cranmer and Christensen, would never have been filed, had
the payments been made. The Internal Revenue Service
levied on Remco, for a transaction from outside the contract, which was paid by Remco after the lien was filed although they indicated four months before payment, they
had payed same. This is the only item from outside the job
that ever entered into the picture. In all probability had
Remco paid promptly, this would not have entered into the
picture.

3
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POINT n
THE TRIAL COURTS DISMISSAL OF REMCO'S
CLAIM FOR FAILURE TO CANCEL LIEN WAS PROPER.
This counterclaim and cross-complaint was brought
under the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 38-1-24, providing for $20.00 a day payment for a failure to cancel lien
after notice. There is no question as to the statute involved
in this particular transaction, however the only way
that this could be brought into effect, would be if the
ir-oney was tendered, in conformity with the lien. This was
not done. The money was never tendered, and there is no
proof in the transcript whatsoever of any tender of any item.
There is only an offer of payment upon release of the lien,
and the offer was couched in a sum satisfactory to Remco,
and not satisfactory to Triangle. There was never an actual
tender, and even with a proper amount, the statute would
not be applicable until there is a tender, or payment. As long
as there is a bonafide argument over the amount due, even
tender of a lesser amount, would not place the matter under
this penalty. This position is upheld in Brimwood Homes,
Inc., vs. Knudsen Builders Supply Co., 14 Utah 2nd 419, 385
Pacific 2nd, 982. This was a situation where lien rights were
not waived and the court held that they could be collected
together with attorney fees and failure to release futures,
was not actionable.
This lien was not placed for an exaggerated amount,
contrary to the allegations of Remco. At the time of placing
the lien, it was actually placed for an amount less than
what was coming. When one deducts from it the Internal
Revenue Levie, which had not been paid at the time the
lien was placed, together with the other items of employees
of Triangle, which were later paid direct, amounts in excess
of that which Triangle felt proper, and the lien should have
been greater than it actually was. There was no time from
the filing of the lien until the payment after trial, that money was not owed to Triangle.
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POINT m
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN HOLDING
THAT TRIANGLE NEITHER HAD TO FINISH THE DRY
WALL WORK OR PAY THE AMOUNT TO HAVE THE
WORK FINISHED, OR PAY FOR MATERIALS REQUIRED
TO COMPLETE THE JOB.
There is no question that Triangle had sufficient materials on the job to complete same, these materials were taken
over by Remco. There is also no question that Remco was
told by Triangle, that at anytime the matter was paid, that
they would be quite happy to come along and complete the
job. They were never advised that Remco was hiring other
people and having other people do the work. There is no
question that almost all contractors follow a habit of when
they think they are going to be able to charge it against the
sub-contractor, of paying out without hesitation anything
that they happen to think of. The trial court held that only
the proper costs of completing the job to Triangle, should
be deducted from what they had coming. The amounts that
Triangle admitted were proper and would have cost Triangle, had they completed the job, were deducted. The reference in the Appellants Brief, in Young vs. Hansen, 117
Utah 591, 218 Pacific 2nd, 666, is not in point, in as much as
this is a contract on sale of property, and nothing to do with
a building contract. The same is true on the case of Perkins
vs. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 Pacific 2nd, 446, same is not
in point in as much as it is a purchase contract on real estate, and is not a building contract and conditions are different. Also those items in the other liens that Triangle felt
were proper items, when applied to its contract, were allowed as offsets in the amount determined by the court.
POINT IV
THE COURT DID NOT ERROR IN FEEDING THAT
THERE WAS NO ESTOPPEL ON THE CONTRACT WHEN
TRIANGLE CONTINUED WITH ITS PERFORMANCE
AFTER THE BREACH OF THE SPECIAL PROVISIONS
OF PARAGRAPH 5, PROVIDING FOR PAYMENT OF MATERIALS.
There is no question that any bonafide contractor tends

5
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to work things out, and had money been coming shortly, that
Wagstaff or Triangle, as he was doing business, would not
have stood on a breach. There is no question that he put his
own money into the transaction for a considerable period of
time to the point that he was in trouble with Internal Revenue on other items, that he performed as long as he could
on his own finances. However, there was continuing failure
to make other payments and continuing breaches.
The Appellant cites Prudential Federal Savings & Loan
Association, vs. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company, 7
Utah 2nd 366, 325 Pacific 2nd 899, as authority, that a breach
of an insubstantial nature, which is severable and does not
vitally change the transaction, and does not release the
other party completely from performing his obligations under contract, but gives rise to right for damages for any loss
occasioned thereby should be authority for the Appellants
position. This Prudential item, was enforcement of a new
contract which was entered into in writing after the breach,
and is completely out of point. The new contract covered
the matter. Also when one starts talking about insubstantial breaches, the failure to pay a material payment of
$14,580.00, on a $49,000.00, contract is not insubstantial.
POINT V
THE COURT DID NOT ERROR IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES.
There is no question of an amount due and owing under
the contract, although money had been posted, this was
still a lien action, and although the lien had previously
been released by court order, upon the posting, the Shupe
case upholds the courts action. Percentages set forth by
Appellant in his brief, in point 5, do not take into consideration the other amounts paid after the filing of the lien.
Without any question the Shupe case upholds the position of the court, pertaining to attorney fees, and as long as
this action is under a lien, even though the money had been
posted, the provisions of Title 38-1-18, Utah Code Annotated,
apply. In addition to the Shupe case, which is found at 18
Utah 2nd, 134, 15 Pacific 2nd, 246, the case of Brimwood
Homes vs. Knudsen Builders Supply Company, applies, this
is found as 14 Utah 2nd, 419, 385 Pacific 2nd 982. Actually
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this Rrimwood case1 in most instances is very similar to
the case' at bar and decides most of the points set forth
therein, with the exception that in the instant case we do
not have the question of any release.
The first part of the first paragraph in the conclusion in
the Appellants Brief, is an admission that the trial court was
correct in all of its fln^^rs,
CONCLUSION
There was no failure to perform on the part of Triangle,
and the Appellant has admitted that they did not make the
payments as indicated and has admitted that they did not
ask or advise' Triangle that they were going to complete the
job.
Under these conditions, the aetn-i
should be affirmed.
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Respectfully Submitted,
FENTON
Attorney for Respondent.
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